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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Development of Speed, Memory, and Fluid Reasoning in Children 
by 
Duneesha S. De Alwis 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Washington University in Saint Louis, 2011 
Associate Professor Sandra Hale, Chairperson 
Children’s memory and higher-order cognitive abilities such as fluid reasoning 
improve with age, but the relationships between these abilities are not well understood.  
The developmental cascade model proposed by Fry and Hale (1996) suggests that age 
related improvements in speed of processing are related to improvements in working 
memory, which in turn influence fluid reasoning.  Recent research in adults suggests 
secondary memory is also an important predictor of fluid reasoning. The relations 
between working memory and fluid reasoning have been studied extensively in both 
adults and children. However, the relationships between working memory, secondary 
memory, and fluid reasoning have not been simultaneously examined in children.  
 In this study 113 children (6 to 12 years of age) completed a battery of cognitive 
tests including speed of processing, working memory, secondary memory, and fluid 
reasoning. Correlation, regression, and path analyses were used to better understand the 
relationships between working memory, secondary memory, and fluid reasoning. Results 
indicated that only working memory accounted for significant unique variance in 
predicting fluid reasoning in children. Secondary memory influenced fluid reasoning 
indirectly by mediating the relations between speed and working memory. 
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OVERVIEW 
Children’s ability to process information faster matures with age (e.g., Hale, 
1990). Similarly, children’s short-term memory capacity (Dempster, 1981) and reasoning 
abilities (Carlson & Jensen, 1982) show age-related improvement. The developmental 
cascade model proposed by Fry and Hale (1996) explored the relations among these three 
variables. The cascade model showed that age-related improvement in speed of 
processing was directly related to age-related improvement in working memory, which in 
turn influenced improvement in fluid reasoning. Thus, the effect of age-related 
improvement in processing speed on fluid reasoning was mediated by working memory.   
Evidence for the developmental cascade model has been found in both children 
and adults (Demetriou, 2002; Kail, 2007; Nettelbeck & Burns, 2010; & Salthouse, 1991). 
Although some studies show that a large proportion of the variance in fluid reasoning can 
be accounted for by speed-related improvements in working memory (e.g. de 
Riabaupierre & Lecerf, 2006; Nettelbeck & Burns, 2010), others show that there is a 
significant proportion of age-related variance in fluid reasoning that is not explained by 
changes in speed and working memory (Fry & Hale, 2000). 
Recent work by Unsworth and Engle (2006, 2007) suggests secondary memory as 
a possible candidate for the missing mediator in the developmental cascade model. The 
terms primary and secondary memory were first introduced by William James (1890). 
According to James, primary memory refers to the current contents of consciousness, 
whereas secondary memory refers to memories that need to be brought back to 
consciousness through retrieval.  Even though literature often uses the terms short-term 
and long -term memory to refer to primary and secondary memory, more recent work by 
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Nash Unsworth and colleagues re-introduced James’ original terms when discussing the 
relationship between working memory and long-term memory. For this reason, in the 
current study, I use the terms primary and secondary memory to refer to short-term and 
long-term memory.  According to Unsworth and colleagues, primary memory refers to 
information that is currently fully activated (i.e., in the focus of attention according to 
Cowan’s (1999) embedded processes model) whereas secondary memory refers to items 
that are outside the focus of attention.  Cowan’s model is described in greater detail in the 
literature review below. 
Unsworth and Engle (2007) closely examined the relationship between working 
memory and fluid reasoning in healthy young adults. They suggested that one important 
function of working memory is the ability to retrieve information that has been recently 
displaced from the focus of attention (i.e., retrieval of information from secondary 
memory).  Moreover, these authors suggest that this function may be the key to 
understanding why measures of working memory do such a good job of predicting fluid 
reasoning in adults.  
In a recent study, I explored the relationship between fluid reasoning and 
immediate and delayed recall in children ages 6 to 16 years. The results showed that 
children’s reasoning was significantly correlated with retrieval from secondary memory 
(De Alwis, Myerson, Hershey, & Hale, 2009).   Although this study demonstrates that 
secondary memory, like working memory, predicts fluid reasoning in children, I was not 
able to directly compare the two predictors.  Despite the fact that the working memory 
system has been studied extensively in children, the potential role of secondary memory 
in children’s fluid reasoning has not been fully explored.  
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The goal of the present study is to consider secondary memory as a possible 
mediator of age-related improvements in fluid reasoning in children and systematically 
explore the role of secondary memory within the context of the developmental cascade 
model.  In addition, the current study should shed light on the relationship between the 
development of working memory and secondary memory to better understand why 
working memory is such a good predictor of fluid reasoning in children (Fry and Hale, 
1996; Nettelbeck & Burns, 2010; de Riabaupierre & Lecerf, 2006). 
In the next section I will present relevant literature concerning the relationships 
among age, processing speed, working memory, secondary memory, and fluid reasoning 
in children.  As each section is introduced, each of these constructs will be defined and 








Development of Speed of Processing 
 
The construct of cognitive processing speed (referred to throughout as speed of 
processing) is one that has been studied for a very long time. Children’s ability to process 
information more quickly improves with age (Cerella & Hale, 1994), and speed of 
processing appears to play an important role in memory development.  For example, 
studies with both adults and children have shown that the greatest attenuation of age-
related variance in working memory occurs after controlling for processing speed (e.g., 
Fry & Hale, 1996; Salthouse, 1996).    
Researchers interested in understanding why speed of processing improves during 
childhood have suggested that the improvement may be directly related to brain 
maturation. The maturation of myelin, which insulate neurons, increases the speed at 
which neural impulses are transmitted. Many researchers have suggested that myelination 
may be the neurobiological mechanism underlying improvements in speed of processing 
in children (e.g., Hale, 1990; Rabinowicz, 1980).  Although beyond the scope of the 
current study, it is now possible to obtain measures of white matter using neuroimaging 
to examine the relationship between myelination and processing speed.  In the current 
study, however, I focus on behavioral measures of processing speed.  
In studying the development of speed of processing, Hale (1990) proposed that 
there is a global developmental trend in speed of processing. Hale’s hypothesis suggests 
that the age-related increase in speed is not specific to one task but is global in nature and 
that the time a child requires to complete a task can be identified as a proportion of the 
time required by an adult. To test this hypothesis, Hale collected data from children, 
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adolescents, and young adults from the following four age groups: 10, 12, 15 and 19 
years.  Participants performed a battery of speeded reaction time tasks that included 
choice reaction time, letter matching, mental rotation and abstract matching. The results 
showed that for each of the three younger groups, performance on all four tasks was a 
precise linear function of the young adults’ performance in the corresponding conditions.   
Kail (1991a) provided supporting evidence for a speed of processing global 
developmental trend based on a meta-analysis of 72 studies.  Consistent with Hale 
(1990), Kail found that processing speed in children increased linearly as a function of 
the processing speed of adults.  In addition, Kail found that this increase was an 
exponential (non-linear) function.  That is, initially speed of processing improves rapidly, 
but improvement becomes more gradual during late childhood and adolescence.  Later 
research by Kail and colleagues (Kail, 1993; Kail & Park, 1992) further established that a 
non-linear function describes the developmental trajectory of speed of processing during 
childhood and adolescence.  As an illustration, I took raw scores from the WISC-IV 
Cancellation subtest and calculated response time per item for different age groups. As 




Figure 1.   Response time per item calculated using raw scores from the Cancellation 
subtest of the WISC-IV.  Response time per item is plotted as a function of age. Data 
were taken from the WISC-IV Administration and Scoring Manual (2003), Table A1 
(Appendix A).  
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Kail and Miller (2006) further explored the global developmental trend comparing 
response latencies in verbal and nonverbal tasks. Children between 9 and 14 years of age 
were tested on 10 different speed tasks.  The results supported the global developmental 
trend in which children’s response times increased linearly as a function of adult’s 
response times in the same conditions. In comparing the verbal and nonverbal domains, it 
was found that response times on tasks from both domains showed a linear increase as a 
function of age. At age 9 years, there was a difference in the rate of development between 
the two domains (the slope was steeper for nonverbal than verbal tasks), but this 
difference was not apparent by age 14 years. However, one problem in trying to 
determine whether there are domain-specific differences in verbal and nonverbal 
processing speed (a difference that is observed in late adulthood) is that children are still 
acquiring vocabulary and expanding their knowledge base. As such, differences in 
knowledge base may interact with actual differences in speed of processing across verbal 
and nonverbal domains. 
In summary, in the area of cognitive development, speed of processing is an 
important topic because the ability to process information faster appears to facilitate the 
development of many cognitive abilities. Moreover, almost all research conducted since 
the body of work reviewed by Fry and Hale (2000) has continued to confirm that the 
developmental improvements in task-independent processing speed are orderly and 
follow an exponential, negatively-accelerated trajectory of improvement between the 




Development of Working Memory 
 
The construct of working memory is discussed in many areas of psychology, 
including cognitive psychology, clinical neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience.   
However, both across and within these disciplines, researchers have varied opinions of 
the definition of working memory.  The general consensus is to define working memory 
in relation to both storage and processing of information. However, in the literature the 
term “working memory” is at times used to refer only to storage, only processing, or a 
combination of the two.  For the purpose of this study, I use the term working memory in 
reference to both storage and processing of information.   
In this section I will briefly discuss the history of working memory in relation to 
short-term memory and provide an overview to the working memory model proposed by 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Other models of working memory proposed by Cowan, 
Oberaurer, and Unsworth and Engle will be addressed in a subsequent section in which I 
discuss the relationship between working memory and secondary memory.  
Baddeley’s Model of Working Memory 
In the 1960s, the term short-term memory was used to describe the retention of 
small amounts of information over brief time intervals (Baddeley, 2000a).  However, in 
the 1970’s, the original concept of short-term memory was incorporated with the more 
complex framework of a working memory system. Within the multi-component system 
of working memory, short-term memory became a subcomponent responsible for the 
storage function (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  Baddeley and Hitch (1974) used the term 
working memory to refer to a system comprising multiple components. They emphasized 
the functional importance of the system as opposed to simple storage and indicated that 
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the system was involved in both the temporary maintenance and manipulation of 
information (Baddeley, 2001).  The original model of working memory consisted of three 
components, the phonological loop, the visual-spatial sketch pad (both referred to as 
slave systems), and the central executive which coordinated the functions of the two 
subsystems. The following subsections provide a brief description of each of these 
subcomponents.  
Phonological loop.  The phonological loop is assumed to consist of two 
subcomponents, a phonological store and an articulatory rehearsal system.  The 
phonological loop is generally associated with the storage of verbal information. For 
example, when a series of digits is presented, memory traces of the digits within the store 
decay over a period of a few seconds unless they are refreshed through rehearsal.  
According to Baddeley (2006), apart from refreshing and maintaining verbal information, 
the phonological loop has a second function which is to convert visually-presented 
material into a phonological code. As a result, there is little difference in memory for 
digits that are presented visually or auditorily, because visual digits can be converted into 
a phonological code and then covertly rehearsed .This process of subvocal rehearsal can 
be prevented by a technique called articulatory suppression, in which one is asked to 
vocalize a task irrelevant term such as “the” during the presentation of visual material 
(Baddeley, 2006).  
A clear indicator of the use of the phonological store is a phenomenon termed the 
phonological similarity effect. This phenomenon suggests that items that are similar in 
sound (D, G, P, T, V) are recalled more poorly than items that are dissimilar (F, K, R, W, 
Y) (Conrad & Hull, 1964).  Baddeley (1966a) found a similar effect in which recall of 
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rhyming words such as cat, mat, hat, man, can was poorer compared with non-rhyming 
words such as pit, day cow, pen. Baddeley (1966b) showed that this phenomenon was 
only related to the short-term memory store by increasing the number of items presented 
and providing several learning trials.  Long list lengths and repeated learning eliminated 
the phonological similarity effect because the meaning of the words became more 
important than the sound.  
Another phenomenon, the word length effect, was considered by Baddeley, 
Thomson, and Buchanan (1975) to be an indicator of the articulatory rehearsal process. 
As the name implies, recall of single syllable words such as cow, pen, tree, and book is 
better than recall of polysyllabic words such as refrigerator, university, electricity, and 
opportunity (Baddeley, 2006). Polysyllabic words are recalled less accurately because 
longer words take longer to articulate during rehearsal, thereby lengthening the amount of 
time during which decay or interference can occur (Baddeley, 2006).  
Visual-Spatial Sketchpad. This component of the working memory system is 
involved in temporarily maintaining visual and spatial information. Unlike the 
phonological loop, which has been studied extensively, the sketchpad has not been 
widely explored. Although research has focused on establishing the potential separability 
of the visual and spatial subcomponents, finding tasks that are pure measures of each 
component has been a challenge, mostly because visual information can be verbally 
encoded (Baddeley, 2001). The visual-spatial sketchpad can be interrupted by motor 
movements such as tapping or touching specific locations (Baddeley & Liberman, 1980), 
by eye movements (Lawrence, Myerson, Oonk, & Abrams, 2001), or by presenting 
irrelevant visual patterns or noise (Logie, 1986) . 
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The Central Executive. The central executive is generally known to be the least 
understood component of working memory (Baddeley, 2006). Even though the term 
“executive function” is extensively discussed in the literature, there is little consensus 
regarding the distinctive functions that fall under the umbrella of “executive.” Executive 
functions include functions such as inhibiting task- irrelevant information, updating the 
memory system with relevant information, switching attention between tasks, and 
dividing attention among tasks. (Baddeley, 2001).   
The Episodic Buffer. A fourth component was introduced by Baddeley (2000b) to 
the working memory model to address some phenomena that did not fit the pattern of 
data reflecting the functions of the tripartite working memory system.  For example, 
when a series of numbers are visually presented along with an articulatory suppression 
task (during which the participant repeats the word “the”), participants still recall a fair 
number of digits (the span might drop from seven to five items) (Baddeley, 2000b).  This 
finding raises  the question as to how the digits were stored because the phonological 
loop was occupied with the suppression task. 
Also, in a typical word span task, many participants begin to make errors after 
five or six words. If these words form a meaningful sentence, however, it is possible for 
participants to recall a number of words that exceeds their memory span (Baddeley, 
2000b). This also raises the question of how these words were stored. These findings led 
Baddeley and colleagues to re-evaluate the original three component working memory 
model and introduce the fourth component named the episodic buffer.  According to 
Baddeley (2000b), the two main functions of the episodic buffer include integrating 
information from the verbal and spatial system and linking long-term memory and 
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working memory.  The link between long-term memory and working memory presages 
the work by Unsworth and Engle who suggest that all complex working memory tasks 
reflect a reliance on not just primary memory (i.e., short-term storage, or items currently 
fully activated in the focus of attention) but also secondary memory (i.e., items that are 
outside the focus of attention).  
The Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model of working memory has been examined in 
a number of studies with children (Gathercole et al. 2004; Alloway, Gathercole and 
Pickering, 2006).  Gathercole et al. (2004) tested a large group of children between the 
ages of 4 and 15 years on a battery of working memory tasks. The battery consisted of 
simple and complex verbal and spatial working memory tasks. The simple tasks were 
used as storage measures that predicted the function of the phonological loop and the 
visual-spatial sketchpad. The complex tasks were used as measures of the central 
executive. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the structural organization 
of working memory changed across childhood.  
In this study data were analyzed only from age 6 upwards because some of the 
tasks were not administered to the youngest age groups.  Confirmatory factor analysis 
revealed there were three separate factors. The best fitting model showed that complex 
working memory tasks loaded on factor1, the simple storage verbal tasks loaded on factor 
2, and the simple storage spatial tasks loaded on factor 3.  This was in keeping with the 
three main components of Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) initial model of working memory 
consisting of the central executive, phonological loop and visual-spatial sketchpad. The 
results further showed that the central executive component was linked to both the 
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phonological loop and the visual-spatial sketchpad, but the two latter components were 
independent of each other (Gathercole et al, 2004). 
Alloway, Gathercole and Pickering (2006) supported these results by testing a 
larger group of children between ages 4 and 11 years on similar tasks. In this study 
confirmatory factor analysis again revealed three separate factors that supported the 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model, indicating that the structural organization of working 
memory is established even at the early age of four years. However, the results indicated 
a functional change in this organization across childhood. The youngest group of children 
(4-6 years) showed a very strong relationship between visual-spatial and the central 
executive components but this relationship decreased with age.  
It has been established by a number of researchers that working memory span 
increases with age, showing a steady increase from preschool years through adolescence 
(e.g., Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982; Dempster, 1985).  There are several underlying 
mechanisms that have been proposed to explain this age-related increase in memory span.  
Increase in speed of processing helps to improve working memory span (Cowan, 1997; 
Kail, 1991b; Fry & Hale, 1996). Speed plays an obvious role in terms of maintaining 
information in the verbal working memory slave system through subvocal rehearsal, but 
the role of speed within the visual-spatial slave system is not known. However, it is 
important to note that faster processing can facilitate different strategies (e.g., chunking, 
imagery) that may be used to better maintain verbal or spatial information before recall.  
In the case of the phonological loop, memory capacity increases as a result of 
efficiency in rehearsing information. As children grow older they are able to maintain a 
larger amount of verbal material due to their ability to rehearse the information more 
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quickly (Hulme et al., 1984). However, this ability to spontaneously rehearse information 
is very limited before the age of 7 years (Gathercole & Hitch, 1993).  
During early childhood, children use the visual-spatial sketchpad to remember 
visual information. However, this changes by about age 7. At this time children are able 
to recode visual material into phonological forms and tend to use the phonological loop to 
mediate performance on spatial tasks (Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Hitch, Halliday, 
Schaafstal & Schraagen, 1988).  
This question was explored in a study by Hitch and Halliday (1983) in which 
children 6, 8 and 10 years were asked to recall sequences of spoken words or a 
corresponding set of pictures.  The words varied in length with one, two or three 
syllables.  The results indicated that the two older groups showed the word length effect 
(recalling more shorter words than longer words) for both the auditory and pictorial 
conditions, whereas the youngest group showed this effect only for the spoken words. 
These results support the fact that, unlike older children who spontaneously recode visual 
material into words, younger children do not do so.   
However, the interesting question of how memory span for abstract patterns that 
cannot be verbally recoded still increases with age is not fully understood (e.g. Pickering, 
Gathercole, Hall & Lloyd, 2001). Researchers have suggested that this could be a result 
of  changes in the working  memory structure, such as increases in storage capacity of the 
visual-spatial sketchpad (Logie & Pearson, 1997) or other age-related changes including 
the effective use of strategies, accumulation of knowledge relating to visual-spatial 
structures, and improvements in executive functions (Gathercole et al. 2004).   
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A study by Hale, Bronik and Fry (1997) explored the development of executive 
functions by studying  children’s ability to resist interference and remember task-relevant 
information.  In this study, children 8, 10 and 19 years of age were tested on a series of 
complex working memory tasks. The working memory tasks included conditions in 
which interference was caused by an interleaved secondary task from either the same or 
different domain (verbal versus spatial). In the verbal task, children were shown a series 
of numbers in which each number was of a different color; the interfering task was either 
to say the color aloud (verbal interference) or to touch the same color in a color palette 
(spatial interference).  In the spatial task, participants had to remember different 
locations; the interfering task was either to say the color of the X that marked the location 
(verbal interference) or to touch the same color in a color palette (spatial interference).  
The results of this study showed that only the 8 year olds showed evidence of 
cross-domain interference. That is, the secondary tasks from the same and different 
domain (verbal and spatial) both interfered with the working memory task (although the 
interference was greater for same domain relative to cross domain). In contrast, for the 10 
year olds and adults, interference with working memory occurred only when the 
secondary task was from the same domain. These results suggest that the executive 
functions that are engaged when performing a complex span task (e.g., switching 
between tasks) reaches maturity somewhere between the ages of 8 and 10 years.   
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Development of Fluid Reasoning 
The terms fluid reasoning and fluid intelligence are used interchangeably in the 
literature (Horn & Cattell, 1967; Horn & Hofer, 1992). In this study, I use the term fluid 
reasoning. I will begin with a general overview of intelligence (the larger construct that 
encompasses both fluid and crystallized abilities), followed by a discussion of the 
development of fluid reasoning.  
The term fluid reasoning is often associated with the concept of intelligence or 
Spearman’s “g”. According to Spearman (1927), all abilities are correlated. For example, 
when examining children’s test scores on a wide range of subjects, one could see that 
these scores are correlated although they measure a wide range of abilities. Spearman 
(1927) explains this phenomenon by stating that general intelligence or “little g” is the 
general factor that shares most of the variance between varied cognitive tasks.  
In the 1960’s Spearman’s student Cattell disregarded the notion that intelligence 
is a single general factor.  Cattell and Horn proposed two factors of general intelligence: 
fluid and crystallized or gf and gc (Horn & Cattell, 1967).  Crystallized intelligence is 
learned knowledge and skills and is thought to be influenced by age, education, culture 
and experience. Fluid intelligence, on the other hand, is commonly known as the ability 
to reason and solve novel problems. It is an innate ability that is not determined by any of 
the external factors that influence crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1971).  
Over the years, different theories of intelligence have been proposed. After the 
distinction between fluid and crystallized intelligence, Horn (1985) and Horn and Hofer 
(1992) suggested that this dual concept of intelligence was not sufficient to explain the 
general abilities that contribute to intelligence. Accordingly, they proposed a multiple 
general factor concept of intelligence. According to this theory, intelligence consists of 
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fluid and crystallized components in which the fluid component captures our ability to 
efficiently and accurately solve novel problems, whereas crystallized abilities capture our 
acquired knowledge (i.e., our database of semantic knowledge); in addition, it consists of 
other components that include visual-spatial reasoning, processing speed, and long and 
short-term memory and other components.  
According to Horn and Hofer (1992), a significant distinction between fluid and 
crystallized intelligence can be seen when examining the growth curves of these abilities.  
Both gf  and gc show improvements in early to mid childhood, but during older adulthood 
gc shows an increase while there is a noticeable decline in gf.  Considering the 
development of fluid reasoning during childhood and adolescence, the growth pattern 
shows a non-linear function in which there is a greater increase in performance in early 
childhood and a more gradual increase during adolescence.  Figure 2, which is presented 
below, provides clear evidence of this pattern observed in the normative sample data 
from the WISC-IV Matrix Reasoning subtest.  The WISC-IV Matrix Reasoning subtest is 
known to be a reliable measure of fluid reasoning.  Notably, the function describing 
performance on this subtest follows a negatively-accelerated growth function across three 







Horn and Hofer (1992) further suggested that the pattern of decline in gf   to be 
similar to that of other abilities such as working memory and processing speed. They 
referred to these abilities as “vulnerable abilities” because they decline in older adulthood 
and also show irreversible impairment following brain damage (Horn & Hofer, 1992). 
Crystallized intelligence was known as a “maintained ability” that showed little or no 
decline with aging except in very late adulthood (Horn & Hofer, 1992).  Considering 
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Horn and Hofer’s (1992) hypothesis that vulnerable abilities show similar patterns of 
decline, several theories have been proposed linking speed of processing, working 
memory and fluid reasoning. 
 
Figure 2.  Raw scores from normative data from the WISC-IV Matrix Reasoning subtest 
plotted as a function of age. Data taken from the WISC IV Administration and Scoring 







are represented by the circles, triangles and squares, respectively. The solid lines 
represent the best-fitting polynomial functions for each of the three percentiles.  
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Development of Age, Speed and Working Memory 
The idea that age-related improvements in speed and working memory are related 
has been of interest to both developmental and aging researchers for many years.  
Existing literature provides substantial evidence to support this fact (e.g., Cowan et al. 
1994; Hulme, Thomson, Muir, & Lawrence, 1984;  Kail,1992; Kail & Park, 1994).   
Processing information faster helps to prevent the loss of information while 
performing complex memory tasks.  Losing information can take place either through 
decay of relevant information or by interfering information displacing the “to-be-
remembered” information (Cowan, 1997). Faster processing minimizes the amount of 
information that is lost through interference and decay. 
Hulme et al. (1984) showed that age-related increases in memory span can be 
predicted by speech rate.  Kail (1992) supported this finding by showing that age and 
processing speed independently influenced articulation rate, which in turn was a good 
predictor of memory span. 
 In the Hulme et al. (1984) study, the researchers tested children of ages 4, 7 and 
10 years and a group of younger adults. Memory span and articulation rate were 
measured using one, two and three syllable words. Articulation rate (words per minute) 
and span were determined for each word length. Overall, it was found that memory span 
was affected by the number of syllables.  Memory span for words with multiple syllables 
was lower because the words took longer to say indicating that developmental increases 
in memory span could be attributed to articulation rate.  Importantly, the relation between 
overt articulation rate and memory span was revealed to be a single, age-invariant 
function. 
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Kail (1992) supported these findings with data collected from 9 year old children 
and young adults. Participants completed speed of processing tests and measures of 
memory span. Their rate of articulation was also measured.  Path analysis revealed that 
age-related differences in memory span were mediated by age-related differences in 
speed. When articulation rate was added to the model, it showed that a large amount of 
age-related improvement in articulation rate was mediated by speed. This finding was 
replicated by Kail and Park (1994) using children from United States and Korea.  
More recently, Magimairaj et al. (2009) conducted a study with children between 
6 and 12 years of age to find out the contributions of short-term memory storage, 
processing speed, and attentional allocation on working memory. Correlational analysis 
revealed that all three variables (storage, speed and attentional allocation) were 
significantly related to working memory performance after controlling for age. 
Furthermore, regression analysis showed that when age was controlled, both short-term 
storage and speed accounted for unique variance in working memory performance while 
attentional control did not. Overall, these researchers suggest that short-term storage and 
processing speed are important predictors of performance of working memory.   
 
Development of Age, Speed, Working Memory and Fluid Reasoning 
In this section I will focus my discussion on the developmental cascade model 
(Fry and Hale, 1996) along with supporting evidence.  When describing the 
developmental cascade model, it is best to begin the discussion with reference to the 
Speed Mediation Theory of Intelligence proposed by Kail and Salthouse (1994). Kail and 
Salthouse (1994) believe neurobiological causes to be the underlying factors that bring 
about differences in intellectual functioning. The unique aspect of this theory is that it is 
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not based on individual differences; instead, it is a developmental theory of age-related 
changes in speed, working memory and intelligence across the lifespan (Kail & 
Salthouse, 1994).  Their work supports this hypothesis by providing evidence for 
improvement and decline in speed of processing, working memory and intelligence (in 
particular  fluid reasoning)  across the lifespan (Kail, 1991; Kail and Park 1994, 
Salthouse, 1991). Salthouse (1991) provided evidence that age-related changes in speed 
of processing accounted for all of the age-related changes in fluid reasoning during late 
adulthood, with the relationship between speed and fluid reasoning being mediated by 
working memory. Overall, the Speed Mediation Theory of Intelligence supports the idea 
that general speed of processing is an indirect determinant of age-related changes in fluid 
reasoning, whereas working memory is an important mediator in this relationship as it is 
the single best predictor of fluid reasoning and is itself directly affected by speed of 
processing. 
Developmental Cascade Model 
In keeping with the Speed Mediation model proposed by Kail and Salthouse 
(1994), Fry and Hale (1996) explored the relationship between speed of processing, 
working memory and fluid reasoning in children.  The purpose of the study was to gain 
an understanding of the effects that age-related differences in processing speed and 
working memory had on age-related differences in fluid reasoning. The researchers tested 
214 children, adolescents and young adults between the ages of 7 to 19 years. The speed 
tasks included disjunctive reaction time tasks, (two vertical arrows pointing in the same 
different directions requiring same/different judgment), shape classification (requiring 
same different shape judgment), visual search (requiring a target present absent 
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judgment), and abstract matching (required participants to find the best match to a target 
pattern).  Working memory was assessed using four different tasks assessing verbal and 
spatial working memory. In the simple verbal and spatial tasks, participants saw a series 
of digits and recalled these in the same order in which they were presented (verbal) or 
recalled specific locations on a grid that were cued by an X (spatial).  In the complex 
working memory task participants reported the colors of the digits and Xs while 
maintaining the digit and location information in working memory.  Fluid reasoning was 
measured using the standard Raven’s Progressive Matrices test.  
Using path analyses the researchers explored the relations between age, speed, 
working memory and fluid reasoning. Overall, the results showed that age-related 
increases in speed of processing influenced the development of working memory, which 
in turn influenced performance on the fluid reasoning task. Thus, it was found that both 
age-related and individual differences in working memory mediated the relationship 
between speed of processing and fluid reasoning.  The paths in the developmental 

























Figure 3.  Schematic of the developmental cascade model depicting the paths between 
age, speed, working memory and fluid reasoning adapted from Fry and Hale (2000). 
 
As shown in this path diagram, path 1 depicts the relations between age and fluid 
reasoning that is not explained by speed or working memory. According to Fry and Hale 
(1996), this path showed a path coefficient of .36. Path 2, the path between speed and 
fluid reasoning was not significant and showed a path coefficient of -.02, indicating that 
speed did not have a direct effect on fluid reasoning. Path 3 between working memory 
and fluid reasoning showed a coefficient of .38 whereas  path 4 between speed and 
working memory showed a coefficient of -.51. Paths 5 and 6 between age and speed and 
age and working memory showed coefficients of -.86 and .22 respectively. Overall the 
results in Fry and Hale (1996) indicated that the relations between speed and fluid 
reasoning were mediated by working memory. Also, there was a significant proportion of 













The results from Fry and Hale (1996) replicated and extended those of Kail 
(1991b) and Kail and Park (1994); they were also in keeping with the Kail and Salthouse 
(1994) model that was hypothesized but not tested in children.  Kail (2007) provided 
further support for the developmental cascade model by providing longitudinal evidence. 
Children between 8 and 13 years were tested on a series of speed, working memory and 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices in two testing sessions that were one year apart. These 
results further supported the developmental cascade model by providing stronger 
evidence for a causal relationship in which working memory has a direct influence on 
fluid reasoning, whereas the effect of speed was indirect.  
Other recent studies have further explored the developmental cascade model and 
the findings have provided additional support for the developmental cascade.  Demetriou, 
Constantinos, Spanoudis, & Platsidous (2002) conducted a 2 year longitudinal study of 8 
to 14 year olds. Participants were tested on a large battery of speed of processing, 
working memory and problem solving tasks.  Structural equation modeling showed that 
these variables were interrelated in a cascade fashion with speed influencing working 
memory performance, which in turn had a direct effect on problem solving.   
de Riabaupierre & Lecerf (2006) conducted a cross-sectional study with children, 
young adults and older adults to assess the role of speed and working memory on fluid 
reasoning. The speed tasks included a letter comparison and pattern comparison test, the 
working memory measures included reading span and a matrices test, and the measure of 
fluid reasoning was the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices. In all three groups, the 
results supported the cascade model and results revealed that most of the age-related 
variance in fluid reasoning was accounted for by a combination of working memory and 
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speed. The researchers also found a difference in the cascades between children, younger 
and older adults. They found speed to account for more age-related variance in the child 
and young adult groups while working memory accounted for more variance in the older 
adult group.   
Nettlebeck and Burns (2010) conducted a study to explore the role of speed 
working memory and reasoning ability across the lifespan.  The study tested children 
between the ages of 8 to 14 years and adults between the ages of 18 to 87 years.  Multiple 
measures were used to measure speed and working memory while fluid reasoning was 
measured using the Cattell Culture Fair Test (which, unfortunately is a timed test and 
thus their measure of fluid reasoning is confounded by speed). The data provided 
supporting evidence of a cascade for both children and adults, where age-related changes 
in speed and working memory accounted for variance in age-related changes in fluid 
reasoning (although it would be ideal to replicate this finding using an untimed test to 
measure fluid reasoning). Similar to the de Riabaupierre & Lecerf (2006), Nettelbeck and 
Burns found that adults’ age-related changes in working memory (which were not 
mediated by speed) made an independent contribution in explaining variance fluid 
reasoning. The child assessment of the cascade model, however, supported the original 
findings reported by Fry and Hale (1996).  
Even though the developmental cascade model explains a significant proportion 
of the age-related variance in fluid reasoning, some studies have shown that there is  
remaining age-related variance that remains unexplained. For example, the Fry and Hale 
(1996) study showed that there was  about 20% of the age-related variance that was 
unexplained by speed and working memory. These findings introduce the possibility that 
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an additional variable could be included into the model to bring about complete 
mediation. Importantly, recent studies examining the role of working memory in fluid 
reasoning in adults have suggested the importance of the ability to retrieve information 
from secondary memory (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2007) as the key factor that determines 
why working memory predicts fluid reasoning. 
Considering the research on the relationship between  secondary memory and 
fluid reasoning in adults (Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Unsworth, Brewer & Spillers, 2009) 
and children (De Alwis, Myerson, Hershey, & Hale, 2009), it is reasonable to propose 
secondary memory as a candidate for the missing mediator that could account for the 
unexplained variance in the developmental cascade model.  Moreover, even if the 
development of the ability to retrieve information from secondary memory is not the 
ONLY factor that is responsible for the development of fluid reasoning (i.e., 
developmental improvements in primary memory may also play a critical role), it is 
possible that both the development of working memory and secondary memory may 
directly influence the development of fluid reasoning.  These two possibilities are 






Figure 4.  Schematic of a modification of the Fry and Hale (1996) model with an 






Development of Primary and Secondary Memory 
 
As discussed before, William James (1890) first proposed the division of memory 
into two systems. According to James primary memory refers to the current contents of 
consciousness, whereas secondary memory refers to memories that need to be brought 
back to consciousness through retrieval. This distinction between primary and secondary 
memory was carried forward in 1965 in Waugh and Norman’s model. The current 
literature generally uses short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM) to 
refer to primary and secondary memory respectively.  However, one of the critical ideas 
recently put forward by Unsworth and his colleagues (e.g., Unsworth, Spillers & Brewer, 
2010) is that traditional working memory tasks may appear to measure both primary 
memory and secondary memory.  For this reason, in the current study I will use the terms 
primary and secondary memory rather than STM and LTM.  
Primary and secondary memory has been distinguished in many ways with the 
most important difference being the distinction in capacity. Primary memory is limited in 
capacity and there is a limitation in the number of items that can be maintained in 
conscious awareness at a particular time. The Miller (1956) suggestion of a 7 plus or 
minus 2 items has long been an accepted estimate of primary memory capacity.  
However, recent work by Cowan and colleagues suggest the capacity of primary memory 
may be limited to either 1 or 4 items (Cowan, 2001).  In contrast to primary memory the 
capacity of secondary memory is not as limited as it represents any information relevant 
to the current task.  
 Primary and secondary memory can also be differentiated based on the neural 
substrates that support the two systems. Most of the evidence for this distinction has 
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come from neuropsychological cases of amnesia.  The classic case of patient HM has 
shown that damage to the hippocampus and surrounding areas of the medial temporal 
lobes cause deficits in retrieving long-term memories, but not short-term memories. 
(Milner, 1966).  Patient KF, who had damage to the perisylvian cortex, showed an 
opposite pattern in which short-term memories for verbal material were disrupted where 
as  long-term memories were intact (Shallice  & Warrington, 1970).  
Yet another difference between primary and secondary memory is the different 
types of processing used to store information in the two memory systems.  Verbal items 
are most often coded phonologically in primary memory and semantically in secondary 
memory (Baddeley, 1966b; Craik & Levy, 1970). Also, surface features like visual or 
phonological characteristics help to maintain information in primary memory where as 
deeper levels of processing such as semantic encoding help with retrieving information 
from secondary memory. 
Behavioral evidence for the primary and secondary memory distinction comes 
from serial position effects in list learning tasks. Typically in a list learning task, items 
from the end of the list (which are generally recalled first) are thought to be retrieved 
from primary memory while the early items are thought to be recalled from secondary 
memory (Waugh & Norman, 1965).  Studies from adults and children have shown 




Working memory and its relationship with secondary memory 
The Baddeley (2000b) model of working memory indicates that working memory 
is linked to long-term memory through the episodic buffer. Unlike the models of working 
memory proposed by Nelson Cowan and Klaus Oberauer; Baddeley describes the 
working memory system to be a separate entity from long-term memory. In contrast, 
Nelson Cowan, in his embedded process model, refers to working memory as an 
“activated portion of long-term memory” (Cowan, 1999). In the embedded process model 
the short-term store is simply the activated portion of long-term memory. Within the 
activated portion of the short-term store, the subset of items currently in conscious 
awareness is called the “focus of attention.” According to Cowan, the maximum number 
of items that can be held in the focus of attention is four (see Figure 5). 
Oberauer’s (2002) model of working memory is similar to Cowan’s in that he 
agrees with the view that working memory is an activated component of long-term 
memory. Oberauer disagrees with Cowan only in terms of the capacity of the focus of 
attention. According to Oberauer, the activated items are in a region of direct access, and 
within this region only one item is selected for processing by the focus of attention. 
The recent dual-component model of working memory proposed by Unsworth 
and Engle (2007) also suggests a significant relationship between working memory and 
long-term memory. However, as mentioned earlier, they use the terms primary and 
secondary memory. According to Unsworth and Engle, working memory relies on both 
primary and secondary memory abilities. Primary memory consists of a simple storage 
component which can store about four items (which is similar to the concept of the focus 
of attention described by Cowan, 1999). Secondary (long-term) memory holds the items 
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that have been displaced from primary memory when the capacity of primary memory 
has been exceeded.    
Recent work by Unsworth, Engle and colleagues has focused on exploring the 
components of primary and secondary memory within working memory and also their 
relationship to fluid reasoning abilities. I will discuss some of these studies in detail in the 




Figure 5. Schematic of the Nelson Cowan’s embedded process model of working 
memory adapted from Cowan (1999). 
 
  








Working Memory, Secondary Memory and Fluid Reasoning  
A number of researchers have focused their work on gaining a better 
understanding of the link between working memory and fluid reasoning. In particular, 
Unsworth and Engle (2005) found that correlations between performance on the 
operation span task and the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices were relatively 
independent of the level of difficulty and memory load associated with specific reasoning 
problems. Working memory predicted performance on both high and low memory load 
problems. This led Unsworth and Engle to conclude that something other than the 
number of items that can be held in memory must account for the shared variance 
between working memory and fluid reasoning.  
Salthouse and Pink (2008) conducted a similar study of adults ranging in age from 
18 to 98 and reached the same conclusion.  In this study, the researchers examined the 
correlation between working memory and fluid reasoning across different levels of 
difficulty (i.e., series length) in a working memory task.  They found strong correlations 
with fluid reasoning even for the shortest series lengths of the working memory task, 
leading them to conclude that the relation between working memory and fluid reasoning 
is not dependent on the amount of information that needed to be maintained. 
Unsworth and Engle (2006) further explored the underlying components that 
drive the relation between working memory and fluid reasoning. Their recent work 
suggests that the component of retrieving information from secondary memory is an 
important factor in the relationship. In particular, Unsworth and Engle (2006) proposed 
that different types of span tasks will engage primary and secondary memory components 
to varying degrees in different situations.  For example, in complex span tasks such as 
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reading span, participants are required to make judgments about sentences that are 
presented between items to be recalled.  Because the secondary tasks require that 
participants temporarily switch attention away from maintaining items in primary 
memory, some of the to–be-remembered items must be retrieved from secondary 
memory.  Therefore, Unsworth and Engle argued that complex working memory tasks 
always require the use of both primary and secondary memory. In contrast, simple span 
tasks (during which only maintenance is required) make use of the secondary memory 
component only when the to-be-remembered items exceed four items. Under such 
circumstances, some of the earlier items that have been displaced from primary memory 
need to be recalled from secondary memory.   
To evaluate this hypothesis, Unsworth and Engle (2006) tested a group of 
younger adults on simple and complex working memory and fluid reasoning tests. The 
simple spans consisted of word and letter span tasks, and the complex span tasks 
consisted of operation span and reading span. The fluid reasoning tests were Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices and the Matrix Reasoning subtest from the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence.  Exploratory factor analysis revealed three distinct factors: simple 
spans with longer list lengths, simple spans with shorter list lengths, and complex spans. 
There was a strong correlation between the factors for simple spans with longer list 
lengths and complex spans but only moderate correlations between both of these factors 
and simple spans with short list lengths.  In terms of fluid reasoning, simple spans with 
longer list lengths and complex spans were both better predictors of fluid reasoning than 
simple span with shorter list lengths. Overall, Unsworth and Engle concluded that 
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retrieving information from secondary memory was an important predictor of fluid 
reasoning in adults. 
In a more recent study, Unsworth, Spillers and Brewer (2010) explored the 
functions of the two components of primary and secondary memory within  working 
memory .  Their results revealed that the ability to maintain information in primary 
memory and the ability to retrieve information from secondary memory are two 
important components of working memory. In this study they tested a group of young 
adults between the ages of 18-35 on a battery of tasks that consisted of immediate free 
recall, working memory and fluid reasoning.  Confirmatory factor analyses and structural 
equation models were used to identify the relationships among the constructs (i.e., the 
latent variables). Overall, the results supported a dual-component model of working 
memory indicating that working memory consisted of both primary and secondary 
memory components. This conclusion was based on the fact that their results revealed 
that both primary and secondary memory components accounted for unique variance in 
working memory. 
Mogel, Lovett, Stawaski, and Sliwinski (2008) suggested that secondary memory 
was a better predictor of fluid reasoning than working memory. In their study, 
participants were tested on multiple measures of processing speed, working memory, 
secondary memory, and primary memory. They used the Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
test as the single measure of fluid reasoning.  Structural equation modeling was used to fit 
the data and the results showed that secondary memory accounted for a unique variance 
over and above what was accounted for by working memory.  
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In contrast, recent work by Unsworth, Brewer and Spillers (2009) showed that 
both the ability to retrieve information from secondary memory and the ability to 
maintain and manipulate information in working memory are important predictors of 
fluid reasoning in young adults.  They analyzed data from participants between ages of 
18 to 35 years who were tested on multiple measures of working memory, secondary 
memory and reasoning tasks. Structural equation modeling suggested that both working 
memory and secondary memory were related to fluid reasoning, and accounted for both 
shared and unique sources of variance in fluid reasoning.  
A recent reanalysis of data from McCabe et al. (2010) supported the above results 
by directly comparing working memory and secondary memory as predictors of fluid 
reasoning in adults between the ages of 18 to 90 years. The working memory battery 
included three complex verbal span tasks while the measures of secondary memory were 
taken from the California Verbal Learning Test (recall of the first 12 items from trial 1, 
the last learning trial, recall after the distracter list and recall after a 30 minute delay).  An 
exploratory factor analysis revealed two principle components with eigenvalues greater 
than 1.0, establishing working memory and secondary memory as separate abilities.  
When working memory and secondary memory were compared as predictors of 
performance on Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices, both were predictive to a similar 
degree.  Regression analyses showed that working memory accounted for a significant 
proportion of the variance in fluid reasoning over and above the variance explained by 
secondary memory. Similarly, secondary memory accounted for a significant proportion 
of the variance in fluid reasoning over and above the variance explained by working 
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memory.  These results suggest that working memory and secondary memory both 
predict unique as well as shared variance in fluid reasoning in adults.  
Shelton, Elliot, Matthews, Hill, and Gouvier (2010) proposed a slightly different 
view.  In their study, too, participants completed multiple measures of speed, working 
memory, secondary memory, primary memory and fluid reasoning tests. Structural 
equation modeling indicated that working memory accounted for unique variance in fluid 
intelligence whereas the variance explained by secondary memory was shared with 
working memory.  The lack of consistency among these three studies clearly underscores 
the importance of determining how these constructs ultimately predict fluid reasoning.  
In the developmental literature, the role of secondary memory as a predictor of 
fluid reasoning has not been fully investigated. In a recent study I explored the 
relationship between a fluid reasoning task and immediate and delayed recall in 57 
children, ages 6 -16 (De Alwis, Myerson, Hershey & Hale, 2009).  In this study, we 
tested the hypothesis that retrieval from secondary memory is predictive of fluid 
reasoning in children.  Participants were tested repeatedly on the free recall of a supra-
span list (Children’s Memory Scale). Their fluid reasoning ability was assessed using the 
Woodcock-Johnson III Spatial Relations subtest. Immediate recall of the first 10 (pre-
recency) items of the 14-word list was assumed to measure retrieval from secondary 
memory, and selective effects of proactive interference validated this interpretation.  
Consistent with Unsworth and Engle’s (2006, 2007) two-component theory, children’s 
immediate recall of pre-recency items predicted both age and individual differences in 
performance on a test of fluid reasoning and shared the variance accounted for by delayed 
recall. 
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Although De Alwis et al. (2009) study provides evidence for a relationship 
between secondary memory and fluid reasoning in children, the constructs of working 
memory, secondary memory, and fluid reasoning have not been examined in a single 
study in children.  Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine working memory and 
secondary memory as competing predictors of fluid reasoning in children and consider 
secondary memory is a plausible candidate for the missing mediator that might account 
for the variance in fluid reasoning that is unexplained by the developmental cascade. 
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RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES FOR THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
 
Summarizing the research thus far, the following conclusions can be made:  
 
1. Working memory is a significant predictor of fluid reasoning in adults and 
children.  
2. The developmental cascade model (Fry & Hale, 1996) shows that age-related 
improvements in speed and working memory lead to improvements in fluid 
reasoning.  
3. The evidence concerning how much of the variance in fluid reasoning in children 
is explained by the development of speed of processing and working memory is 
inconsistent.  
4. The dual-component model of working memory (Unsworth & Engle, 2006) 
suggests that improvements in secondary memory may account for residual 
variance in the developmental cascade model. 
5. In children, it has been found that the ability to retrieve information from 
secondary memory is correlated with fluid reasoning (De Alwis, Myerson, 
Hershey & Hale, 2009).  
6. The relations among working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning 
have not been examined in a single study in children.  
The main goal of this study was to evaluate the effects of age-related differences in 
speed, working memory, and secondary memory on age- related differences in fluid 
reasoning. More specifically, I examined the developmental cascade model including 
secondary memory as a variable in order to find out if age-related improvements in 
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secondary memory account for the age-related variance in fluid reasoning that is not 
accounted for by speed and working memory.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
Age- related improvement in working memory influences fluid reasoning indirectly 
via its direct influence on the development of secondary memory.  
 
 
The figure shown above is an adaptation of the developmental cascade model proposed 
by Fry and Hale (1996).  As discussed above, according to the cascade model the 
relations between speed and fluid reasoning is mediated by working memory.  Mogel et 
al. (2008) suggests secondary memory to be a better predictor of fluid reasoning 
compared to working memory in young adults. In children too there is evidence for 
secondary memory to be related to fluid reasoning (De Alwis et al., 2009). These findings 
indicate secondary memory to be an important predictor of fluid reasoning.  As suggested 
by Mogel et al., if secondary memory is a better predictor of fluid reasoning than working 
memory, it is possible that working memory influences fluid reasoning indirectly via its 
direct influence on the development of secondary memory.  If this is the case, then the 
path from working memory to reasoning will not be significant, but the path from 
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working memory to secondary memory and the path from secondary memory to fluid 
reasoning will be significant. 
Hypothesis 2:  
Age-related improvements in working memory and age-related improvements 
secondary memory both have direct effects on fluid reasoning and improvements in 




The figure shown above is another adaptation of the Fry and Hale (1996) developmental 
cascade model. As discussed above, according to the cascade model working memory 
mediates the relations between speed and fluid reasoning.  Unsworth and colleagues 
claim that both working memory and secondary memory account for both shared and 
unique sources of variance in fluid reasoning. Therefore, it could be assumed that both 
working memory and secondary memory will independently influence fluid reasoning.  If 
this is the case, then the two paths from working memory and secondary memory to fluid 
reasoning will be significant.  
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Also, unlike in the original cascade where speed influences working memory, the 
above model assumes that secondary memory mediates the relation between speed and 
working memory. This change in the model is based on the findings of Unsworth, 
Spillers and Brewer (2010) who claim secondary memory to be an important component 
within the working memory system. If secondary memory contributes to the performance 
of working memory, then it is possible for secondary memory to mediate the relationship 
between speed and working memory rather than the relation between working memory 





One hundred and twenty six children, aged 6-12 years participated in the current 
study. Children were recruited from public and private schools in the St. Louis County. 
All students from a particular grade within the schools were invited to participate in the 
study, and all who wished to participate were tested. Informed consent by the parents of 
participating children was obtained prior to testing.  Parents also completed a general 
information and health questionnaire (see Appendix A). Children received $10 per hour 
for their participation in the form of gift cards from the Boarders book store.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested in two sessions approximately one week apart. Each 
session of testing began with the administration of a list learning task, followed by two 
speed of processing tasks. Thereafter participants completed a working memory task 
which was followed by a final measure of fluid reasoning. The presentation of tasks was 
consistent across all children.  Each testing session lasted from 45 minutes to an hour. 
Participants were tested individually with breaks between tasks.  
Apparatus 
All computerized tasks were programmed in E-prime 1.1 (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) and presented on a 14 inch lap top computer.  Responses for the 
speed of processing tasks were made by pressing two colored keys on an external 





Speed of Processing Measures 
Four speed of processing tasks were presented in the battery. Samples of the processing 
speed tasks are shown in Figure 6   
Animal Judgment Task.  In this task, on each trial participants were presented with 
two black and white line drawings of an animal and an object (see Figure 6a). The task 
was to identify the animal as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the 
corresponding left/right keys. If the animal was on the right side of the screen they 
pressed the “/ key” and the “z- key” if the animal was on the left side of the screen. 
Participants made their responses on an external keyboard and the response keys were 
covered by colored stickers.  Participants completed 10 practice trials followed by 20 test 
trials. Decision reaction times were recorded in milliseconds by the computer program.  
Size classification Task. This task required participants to make judgments about 
the size of circles. On each trial two colored circles were presented on either side of the 
computer screen. One of the circles was bigger than the other (see Figure 6b). The task 
was to identify the bigger circle as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the 
corresponding left/right keys. If the bigger was on the right side of the screen they 
pressed the “/ key” and the “z- key” if the bigger circle was on the left side of the screen. 
Similar to the previous task, participants made their responses on an external keyboard 
and the decision reaction times were recorded in milliseconds by the computer program. 
Participants completed 10 practice trials followed by 20 test trials.  
Rotation Task.  In this task participants saw line drawings of objects on either side 
of the computer screen. One of the objects was in the upright position while the other was 
upside down (see Figure 6c). The task was to identify the upside down object as quickly 
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and accurately as possible by pressing the corresponding left/right keys. If the upside 
down picture was on the right side of the screen they pressed the “/ key” and the “z- key” 
if the upside down picture was on the left side of the screen. Similar to the previous tasks, 
participants made their responses on an external keyboard and decision reaction times 
were recorded in milliseconds by the computer program. Participants completed 10 
practice trials followed by 20 test trials.  
Visual Search Task. The visual search task required participants to scan two 
arrays of circles and find the array of circles that contained the target item which was a 
blue circle. All other circles in the array were presented in orange (see Figure 6d). The 
task was to identify the array of circles with the target blue circle as quickly and 
accurately as possible by pressing the corresponding left/right keys. If the array with the 
blue circle was on the right side of the screen they pressed the “/ key” and the “z- key” if 
the array with the blue circle was on the left side of the screen. Similar to the previous 
tasks, participants made their responses on an external keyboard and the decision reaction 
times were recorded in milliseconds by the computer program. Participants completed 10 










Figure 6b. Sample problem from the size classification task. 
 








Figure 6d. Sample problem from the visual search task  
 
Figure 6. Sample of speed of processing tasks 
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Working Memory Measures 
Color Span. This working memory span task was adapted from Fry and Hale 
(1996). In this task participants were shown a series of digits ranging from one to nine. 
Each digit was randomly presented in red, white or blue in the middle of a white screen. 
As each digit was presented participants were asked to report the color of the digit. At the 
end of the series, they were asked to recall the digits in the same order in which they were 
presented. (Schematic of the color span task is presented in Figure 7). Considering the 
nature of verbal interference (reporting the colors of the digits while maintaining their 
identities in working memory) this task is considered to be a reliable assessment of  
verbal working memory (Hale, Myerson, Rhee, Weiss & Abrams, 1996). The series 
lengths were presented in ascending order beginning with a series length of two items and 
continuing to a series length of nine items. There were three trials in each series length 
and the task was discontinued if performance on all three trials within a series length was 
incorrect. Participants completed seven practice trials which were followed by the test 
phase. Feedback was provided during practice and additional practice was provided if the 
participant was not comfortable to proceed to the test phase. The longest series of items 
correctly recalled was considered to be the dependent measure and will be referred to as 
working memory span.  
Each trial was initiated by a green fixation point which was followed by a blank 
screen of 500 ms.  Thereafter the digits were randomly presented with each digit 
appearing on the screen for 3 seconds.  At the end of the series a blank screen appeared 
for a 500 ms which was followed by a recall cue (a green square presented at the center 
of the screen accompanied by a beep). Participants reported the digits and the 
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experimenter recorded the answers. The experimenter pressed the mouse to advance to 
the next trial.  
“Blue” 
“Red” 





Correct Response: Five, Nine, and Two 
 
Figure 7. Schematic of the color span task 
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Counting Span.  This working memory task which was adapted from Alloway, 
Gathercole and Pickering (2006), is considered to be a reliable measure of complex 
working memory in children. On each trial participants saw an array of shapes. The 
shapes consisted of green circles, orange circles and blue squares. The task required 
participants to count the number of blue squares presented on each array and say the 
number. The number of squares on the array ranged from one to nine. The array of shapes 
was presented at the center of a blank screen and participants had as much time as they 
liked to count the squares. Participants pressed the space bar when they were ready to 
proceed to the next array of shapes. At the end of the series, participants were cued to 
recall the numbers in the same order in which they said them. (Schematic of the counting 
span task is presented in Figure 8). 
The series lengths were presented in ascending order beginning with a series 
length of two items and continuing to a series length of nine items. There were three trials 
in each series length and the task was discontinued if performance on all three trials 
within a series length was incorrect. Participants completed seven practice trials which 
were followed by the test phase. Feedback was provided during practice and additional 
practice was provided if necessary. The longest series of items correctly recalled was 
considered to be the dependent measure and will be referred to as working memory span.  
Each trial was initiated by a green fixation point and tone which was followed by 
a blank screen of 500 ms.  Thereafter the arrays of shapes were randomly presented. At 
the end of the series a blank screen appeared for a 500ms which was followed by a recall 
cue (a green square presented at the center of the screen accompanied by a beep). The 




     
“Beep” 
 Correct Response: Two and Six 
 
Figure 8.  Schematic of the counting span task
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Secondary Memory Measures 
 
California Verbal Learning Test- Children’s Version (CVLT-C). This test 
consisted of a list of 15words that could be categorized (see Appendix B). The categories 
were fruits, clothing, and toys.  There were five learning trials.  Children heard the list of 
words and were asked to recall the words in any order. The experimenter recorded the 
responses.  In the standard administration of this test, after the fifth trial a distracter list is 
presented and thereafter the original list is recalled. For the purpose of this study, two 
speed of processing tasks were administered after the fifth trial and participants were 
asked to recall the original list thereafter (trial 6). (I did not use the distracter list because 
of the possibility of using the distracter list as a study list in a longitudinal follow up to 
this study). In addition, the standard administration of the test requires participants to 
recall the word list after a filled delay of 30 minutes which is followed by a cued recall 
test. For the current study I did not administer the cued recall test and the final free recall 
(trial 7) took place at the end of the testing session which was after about a 40-45 delay.  
The dependent measures for secondary memory were the recall after a short delay on trial 
6 (recall from the trial after the speed of processing tasks were administered) and recall 
on trial 7 (the final free recall trial).  
Children’s Memory Scale (CMS) Word List Learning Task. In this task 
participants heard a list of fourteen random words (see Appendix C). On the first trial 
they heard all fourteen words which they recalled in any order. In the subsequent trials 
participants were selectively reminded of the words they missed. Thereafter they were 
asked to recall the list. In the standard administration of this task, at the end of the fourth 
trial participants hear and recall a different list of words (distracter list) and thereafter 
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recall the original list. The original list is recalled once more after a delay of about 30 
minutes. 
For the purpose of this study participants performed two speed of processing tasks 
after the final learning trial (trial 4) and recalled the list of words thereafter (trial 5). They 
also recalled the list once again (trial 6) at the end of the testing session which was after 
about a 40-45 minute delay.  (Again, I did not use the distracter list because of the 
possibility of using the distracter list as a study list in a follow up of this study). The 
standard administration of the test has a cued recall component which was not included in 
this study. The dependent measures for secondary memory were the recall after a short 
delay on trial 5 (recall from the trial after the speed of processing tasks were 
administered) and recall on trial 6 (the final free recall trial).  
Fluid Reasoning Measures 
WISC-IV Matrix Reasoning Subtest. The WISC-IV Matrix Reasoning subtest 
(Weschsler, 2003) requires participants to identify missing portions of patterns. For this 
study I used a computerized adaptation of this test. On each trial participants were shown 
an incomplete matrix with answer choices at the bottom of the screen.  A problem similar 
to those presented in the WISC-IV Matrix Reasoning test is shown in Figure 9.  
As each problem was presented, participants indicated their answer choice by 
pointing to the screen and the experimenter selected the answer choice by clicking the 
mouse. The matrix reasoning test consists of 35 test items, but for this study I used only 
the odd problems (18 test problems) because I hope to use the even problems in a follow 
up of this study. Participants had as much time as they needed to complete the test. The 
computer stopped the test if they got three incorrect answers in a row or three out of the 
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last four answers incorrect.  This stopping rule is not a standard part of the administration 
of this test, but because the items progress in difficulty, it seems reasonable that correct 
multiple-choice responses after a long series of failing to select the correct response 
would likely be due to guessing.  Moreover, it is critical not to fatigue young children 
who are less likely to be able to correctly answer the most difficult items. 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrix Reasoning Test. The Raven’s Standard 
Progressive Matrix Reasoning Test (Raven, Court & Raven, 1983) too requires 
participants to identify missing portions of patterns. I used a computerized adaption of 
this test as well. On each trial participants were shown a black and white pattern with a 
missing portion.  Answer choices were presented at the bottom of the screen and 
participants were asked to indicate their answer choice by pointing to the screen. The 
experimenter selected the answer choice by clicking the mouse. A problem similar to 
those presented in the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrix Reasoning test is shown in 
Figure 10. 
 The standard progressive reasoning test consists of a total of  60 test items 
belonging to five sets (A-E) with 12 items each  set (e.g. A1-A12). The items within a set 
become increasingly difficult. For the purpose of this study every third problem 
(Problems 1,3,6,9 and 12) within each set was used (25 test items total) in order to keep 
the number of test items parallel to WISC IV Matirx Reasoning.  Participants had as 
much time as they liked to complete the test. As in the previous task and for similar 
reasons, the computer stopped the test if participants got three incorrect answers in a row 





Figure  9.    Schematic of a problem similar to that in the WISC- IV Matrix Reasoning 
Subtest 
 
Figure 10.  Schematic of a problem similar to that in the Raven’s Standard Progressive 






A total of 126 children between the ages of 6-12 years participated in the study. 
Data from eleven participants were excluded from the analyses due to attention and 
learning disabilities and neurological disorders.  Data from two participants (9 and 10 
year old) were excluded due to high error rates on the processing speed tasks (i.e., 30% or 
higher error rate in at least one condition). Thus, data from 113 participants were 
analyzed in this study. Demographic characteristics of these participants are presented in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1  
Demographic characteristics of participants 
 
Age Group  N  Mean Age   % Female  
 
6-8 years  44  7.56 (0.91)  45    
       
9-10 years  40  9.96 (0.58)  58    
        
11-12 years  29            11.80 (0.61)  45 
 
Although age is treated as a continuous variable in this study, the participants 
have been divided into three groups in Table 1 in order to highlight the age and gender 
distribution. The means and standard deviations for all of the tasks and tests used to 
assess the various cognitive constructs (e.g., working memory) are presented in Table 2. 
The median reaction time scores are presented for the speed of processing tasks. The 
longest series of items correctly recalled (which is referred to as working memory span) 
served as the dependent measure for both working memory tasks.  The mean scores from 
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the delayed recall trials are presented for the CVLT-C and the CMS word list learning 
task, and the mean raw scores are presented for WISC- IV Matrix Reasoning Test and the 
Raven’s Matrices. The inter-correlations between all of the cognitive variables and age 






Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Measures 
Construct and Variable                                Age Group 
      6-8 years       9-10 years         11-12 years  
Speed of Processing* 
    Animal judgment task  
 Mean     698.04      562.92  468.52 
 SD     157.86      110.81  83.83 
    Rotation task 
Mean     1013.40     840.55  710.86 
 SD       264.68     152.78  102.27   
    Size classification task  
  Mean     694.07      545.07  451.83 
 SD        148.94      85.26  60.75 
Visual search task  
Mean     608.04      476.36  410.59 
             SD     145.17      68.10  60.25  
Working Memory 
    Color Span  
Mean     3.98      5.20   5.86 
 SD     1.22      1.14   0.99 
  
    Counting Span 
Mean     3.87      4.95   5.79 
 SD     1.34      1.15   1.32 
  
Secondary Memory 
   CVLT-C 
     Trial 6  
Mean     8.73  11.85   11.90 
 SD     3.34  1.82   1.68 
  
     Trial 7      
Mean     8.91  11.98   11.59 
 SD     3.40  1.54   1.86 
   CMS 
     Trial 5  
Mean     7.91  9.68   10.38 
 SD     2.79  2.23   2.07  
     Trial 6 
Mean     7.44  9.43   9.86 
 SD                  3.18  2.59   2.23 
Fluid Reasoning 
   WISC Matrix Reasoning  
Mean     9.89              12.30   13.45 
SD     2.63               1.56   1.92  
    Raven’s Matrices 
Mean     11.47  15.25   17.21 
SD     3.99  3.99   3.51  
* Average median reaction times are provided for the speed of processing tasks.  
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Table 3 
 Intercorrelations between cognitive variables and age 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Age --             
2Animal Judgment -.676 -- .595 .531 .447 -.215 -.214 -.253 -.367 -.123 -.218 -.321 -.165 
3 Size Classification -.750 .797 -- .653 .654 -.258 -.209 -.391 -.407 -.222 -.294 -.236 -.166 
4 Rotation Task -.639 .733 .811 -- .682 -.054 -.051 -.303 -.334 -.182 -.280 -.133 -.003 
5 Visual Search -.735 .720 .844 .825 -- -.186 -.202 -.304 -.359 -.256 -.260 -.334 -.116 
6 Color Span .605 -.535 -.590 -.419 -.545 -- .476 .397 .349 .185 .203 .337 .248 
7 Counting Span .576 -.518 -.545 -.400 -.536 .658 -- .331 .339 .345 .362 .373 .337 
8 CVLT_T6 .578 -.543 -.644 -.559 -.593 .607 .553 -- .806 .439 .435 .233 .239 
9 CVLT_T7 .540 -.592 -.631 -.561 -.601 .561 .544 .866 -- .383 .422 .237 .223 
10 CMS_T5 .475 -.400 -.485 -.426 -.502 .417 .522 .589 .540 -- .854 .203 .250 
11 CMS_T6 .443 -.443 -.506 -.476 -.483 .413 .520 .574 .557 .884 -- .265 .220 
12 WISC- MR .645 -.617 -.603 -.491 -.647 .595 .604 .518 .501 .443 .467 -- .392 
13 Raven’s MR .576 -.488 -.522 -.370 -.488 .510 .557 .492 .464 .453 .416 .616 -- 
 
Note.  Correlations > .18 are significant at p < .05, correlations > .35 are significant at p < .01.  




Assessment of Cognitive Variables
Assessment of the processing speed construct 
Analyses of processing speed were based on median response times.  Response 
times on each of the four speed tasks were significantly negatively correlated with age, 
indicating that speed of processing increased with age. All four measures were positively 
correlated with each other (rs ranging from .72 to .84).  The skewness indices for three of 
the four speed tasks were greater than 1.0, and therefore a logarithmic transformation of 
response time was used.  Given the strong intercorrelations between the four speed 
measures, an average z score of the four transformed response time scores was calculated 
and used in the correlation and path analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for the composite speed score was .94. 
Assessment of the working memory construct 
Working memory was measured using the color span and the counting span tasks.  
The longest series in which all of the items were correctly recalled was used as the 
dependent measure for each task and will be referred to as working memory span. The 
longest series correct on the two tasks correlated significantly with each other (r = .66). 
Considering the strong correlation between the two working memory measures, a 
composite working memory score was calculated by first converting the results on each 
task to z scores and then calculating an average z score. This composite score was used in 
the subsequent correlation and path analyses. The skewness index for the working 
memory composite was less than one, and the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) 
was .79.  
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Assessment of the secondary memory construct 
The secondary memory composite was calculated as the mean z score from four 
delayed recall trials, two from The California Verbal Learning Test –children’s version 
(CVLT-C) and two from the Children’s Memory Scale (CMS) word list learning task.  
For each task, the dependent measures for delayed recall from secondary memory were 
recall after a short delay (i.e., the recall trial after the speed of processing tasks) and the 
final free recall trial, at least 30 minutes later. The correlations between the four estimates 
of secondary memory ranged between .54 and .59.   
The skewness index for the CVLT-C scores was greater than 1.0, and therefore an 
arcsine transformation was used to normalize the distribution. Even though the 
distribution of the CMS scores was not skewed, an arcsine transformation was used on 
the CMS scores as well in order to maintain consistency and also because transforming 
the data did not significantly change the distribution of the CMS scores.  Because the 
CVLT-C and CMS measures were on different scales, each child’s transformed scores 
were then converted to z scores and the average of the four z scores were used as a 
composite (i.e., the average of the z scores for CVLT-C trials 6 and 7 and CMS trials 5 
and 6).  The reliability coefficient of the composite score of secondary memory was a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .86.  
Immediate recall from secondary memory (i.e., not after a delay) also was 
calculated using the Tulving and Colatla (1970) method (The number of words between a 
given word’s presentation and recall were calculated. If there were seven or fewer words 
intervening between presentation and recall of the particular word, the word was 
considered to be recalled from primary memory. If there were more than seven words, 
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then recall was thought to be from secondary memory).  However, this measure showed a 
relatively lower reliability coefficient of .51 (Cronbach’s alpha). Therefore, only the 
delayed recall trials were used as estimates of secondary memory.  
Assessment of the fluid reasoning construct 
Fluid reasoning was measured using the Standard Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
and the Matrix Reasoning subtest from the WISC- IV.  For each test, the raw score of the 
total number of correct problems were calculated for each participant. As expected, 
Matrix Reasoning and Ravens Progressive Matrices were significantly correlated with 
each other (r = .62).  Considering the strong correlation between the two measures, a 
composite fluid reasoning score was calculated. Because the two measures were on two 
different scales, each child’s score on each measure was first converted to a z-score and 
the average of the two z-scores was used as the composite for fluid reasoning in the 
subsequent analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of the composite 
score of fluid reasoning was .76. 
Assessment of the relations between age and each of the cognitive variables 
 
Because previous research has shown that the growth functions describing 
improvements in cognitive abilities are nonlinear (e.g., Fry & Hale, 1996, 2000; Kail, 
1991; Kail & Ferrer, 2007)  growth functions were analyzed as functions of the logarithm 
of age, and log age was used as a variable in calculating correlations as well as in 
regression and path analyses. The growth function for the processing speed construct is 
shown in Figure 11.As may be seen, composite speed scores decreased linearly as a 
function of log age, reflecting the fact that the response times on which the speed scores 
are based showed a negatively accelerated decrease with age (when age was not 
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transformed). Similarly, as can be seen in Figure 12, the composite working memory 
scores also were a reasonably linear function of log age, although in this case, scores 
increased with age.  The growth curves for secondary memory and fluid intelligence, 
shown in Figures 13 and 14, reveal that the composite scores for these constructs were 






























Figure 11. Growth functions depicting the linear decline of speed as a function of log age 





























Figure 12. Growth function depicting the linear increase in working memory span as a 
function of log age (note the logarithmic scale on the abscissa). 
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Figure 13. Growth function depicting the linear increase in recall from secondary 






























Figure 14. Growth function depicting the linear increase in fluid reasoning as a function 
of log age (note the logarithmic scale on the abscissa). 
Correlational analyses 
Table 4 shows the correlations between log age, and the logarithmically 
transformed z score composite of processing speed , the composite z scores for working 
memory and fluid intelligence, and the arcsine transformed z scores for the secondary 
memory composite. Table 5 shows the intecorrelations between all of the above variables 
after controlling for age.  
Table 4 
Intercorreltations between log age and  composite scores  
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1 Log Age     
2 Speed −.774    
3 Working memory   .650 -.598   
4 Secondary memory   .596 -.585 .637  
5 Fluid Reasoning   .696 -.614 .692 .585 
 
Note. Bold correlations are significant at p<.01 
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Table 5 
Intercorrelations between composite scores with age controlled 
Measure 1 2 3 
1 Speed    
2 Working Memory -.198   
3 Secondary Memory -.242 .409  
4 Fluid Reasoning -.165 .440 .296 
 
Note. Bold correlations are significant at p<.05  
The correlations followed a pattern that was expected: Processing speed showed 
significant correlations with working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning, 
which in turn were significantly correlated with each other (Table 4). The pattern 
remained somewhat the same when age was controlled, although the correlations were 
reduced and the correlation between speed and fluid reasoning was not significant (Table 
5).  These results suggest that children’s working memory and secondary memory predict 
both age and individual differences in performance on fluid reasoning tests. 
Regression analyses 
To explore the relations among these variables further and estimate the unique 
and shared contribution of each memory system to predicting fluid reasoning in children, 
multiple regression analyses were conducted. A hierarchical regression model was 
conducted with log age, working memory and secondary memory entered into the model 
at three steps.  As may be seen in Table 6, secondary memory did not account for 




Hierarchical regression of fluid reasoning on age, working memory and secondary 
memory 
 
Predictor R² ∆ R² F(∆ R²) df 
Age      .478     .478   101.62* 111 
Working Memory     .580     .102     26.86* 110 
Secondary Memory      .589     .009       2.30 109 
 
Note.  * p <.01 
Next, the order of entry of the memory variables was reversed, and secondary 
memory was entered into the model first, followed by working memory. The results, 
shown in Table 7, indicate that working memory contributes to significant unique 
variance in fluid reasoning after accounting for age and secondary memory.   
 
Table 7 
Hierarchical regression of fluid reasoning on age, secondary memory and working 
memory 
Predictor R² ∆ R² F(∆ R²) df 
Age      .478     .478     101.62* 111 
Secondary Memory     .525     .047      10.90* 110 
Working Memory     .589     .064      16.99* 109 
 
Note. * p <.01 
Overall, a combination of age, working memory and secondary memory 
accounted for nearly 60% of variance in fluid reasoning.  Age accounted for 48% of the 
variance, and working memory and secondary memory explained an additional 11%.  
Taken together, the results shown in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that working memory 
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accounted for a unique 6.4% of the variance, and the variance explained by secondary 
memory was shared with working memory. Secondary memory by itself did not make a 
unique contribution to predicting fluid reasoning in children.  
Path analyses 
The main aim of the present study was to consider secondary memory as a 
possible mediator of age-related improvements in fluid reasoning in children and 
systematically explore the role of secondary memory within the context of the 
developmental cascade model.  Path analysis was used to examine three potential 
mediators (speed, working memory, and secondary memory) of the relation between age 
and reasoning ability. Because testing one preferred model can be misleading, multiple 
comparative models based on different hypotheses were tested (MacCallum, 1995). The 
evaluation of the models was done by comparing fit indices. A Goodness of Fit Index 
(GFI) and an Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) of .95 or above, a non-significant 
chi-square, and an RMSEA value of .06 or lower were used as indicators of a good model 
fit (Thompson, 2000). 
Developmental cascade model. The initial path analysis examined whether the 
current data replicated the Fry and Hale (1996) developmental cascade model (Model 1). 
The variables used for this model were log age and the composite scores for speed, 
working memory, fluid reasoning. According to the developmental cascade model (see 
Figure 15), age-related improvements in speed influence the development of working 
memory, and working memory directly influenced the development of fluid reasoning. 
Speed is assumed  not to have a direct effect on fluid reasoning (as indicated by the light 
gray arrow).  As expected, the model provided a very good fit to the data, with a 
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nonsignificant chi-square and good fit statistics (see Table 8).  When the direct path from 
speed to fluid reasoning was tested, it proved to be nonsignificant.  
 
Figure 15.  Developmental cascade model with path coefficients. The path from speed to 
fluid is set to zero. When this path was tested it proved to be non- significant.  
Developmental cascade model with secondary memory.  The next path model 
examined if a similar cascade can be observed when secondary memory was used as a 
substitute for working memory (Model 2). This model was based on evidence that 
retrieval from secondary memory is related to fluid reasoning in adults (Unsworth and 
Engle, 2006) and children ( De Alwis, Myerson, Hershey & Hale, 2009). The variables 
used for this model were log age and the composite scores for speed, secondary memory, 
fluid reasoning. Similar to the developmental cascade model (see Figure 16), age-related 
improvements in speed influenced the development of secondary memory, and secondary 
memory directly influenced the development of fluid reasoning. Speed is assumed not to 
have a direct effect on fluid reasoning (as indicated by the light gray arrow). This model 
too provided a good fit to the data, with a nonsignificant chi-square and good fit statistics 
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(see Table 8).  When the direct path from speed to fluid reasoning was tested, it proved to 
be nonsignificant.  
 
 
Figure 16.   Developmental cascade model and path coefficients with secondary memory 
substituted for working memory. The path from speed to fluid is set to zero. When this 
path was tested it proved to be non- significant.  
 
 Comparing Model 1 to Model 2, it may be seen that the path from working 
memory to fluid reasoning is stronger than the path from secondary memory to fluid 
reasoning (.53 vs. .29). Also, there is a larger proportion of unexplained age-related 
variance in fluid reasoning in model 2 compared to model 1 (.43 vs. .24). 
Hypothesis 1: Age-related improvement in working memory wields its influence 
on fluid reasoning indirectly via its direct influence on the development of secondary 
memory. Hypothesis 1 was based on Mogle et al.’s (2008) finding that in young adults 
secondary memory explained all of the variance in fluid intelligence accounted for by 
working memory as well as additional unique variance.  If this is true, within a 
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developmental context the age-related improvement in working memory wields its 
influence on fluid reasoning indirectly via its direct effect on the development of 
secondary memory.  In this case, the path from secondary memory to fluid reasoning will 
be significant, and the path from working memory to fluid reasoning will not. The path 
model (Model 3a) and the path coefficients can be seen in Figure 17.  The model 
provided a good fit to the data, with a non-significant chi-square and good fit statistics 
(see Table 8). Speed is assumed not to have a direct effect on fluid reasoning and 
secondary memory (as indicated by the light gray arrows) When the direct path from 
speed to fluid reasoning and speed to secondary memory were tested, they proved to be 
nonsignificant.   
Moreover, when the non-significant paths were eliminated, the model (Model 3b, 
see Figure 18) continued to provide a good fit to the data (see Table 8). Even though the 
two models provided a good fit to the data, the models failed to support Hypothesis 1. 
This is because, as can be seen in Figures 17 and 18 the path coefficients from working 
memory to fluid reasoning in both Models 3a and 3b were significant while the paths 
from secondary memory to fluid reasoning were not, which is exactly the opposite of 




Figure 17.  Path coefficients for the cascade model with working memory and secondary 
memory.  The paths from speed to fluid and speed to secondary memory are set to zero. 





Figure 18. Path coefficients for the cascade model with working memory and secondary 




Overall, results related Models 3a and 3b suggests that when both secondary 
memory and working memory are introduced as predictors of fluid reasoning, working 
memory takes the role of being the key predictor explaining all of the variance accounted 
for by secondary memory as well as additional unique variance. 
Hypothesis 2: Age related improvements in working memory and age related 
improvements in secondary memory both have direct effects on fluid reasoning and 
improvements in secondary memory mediate the improvements in working memory. 
Hypothesis 2 was based on Unsworth, Brewers and Spillers’ (2009) finding that both 
working memory and secondary memory make unique contributions to predicting fluid 
reasoning in young adults. In this case both paths from working memory and secondary 
memory to fluid reasoning should be significant.  Furthermore, secondary memory was 
expected to mediate the relationship between speed and working memory based on 
Unsowrth, Spillers and Brewers’s (2010) claim that working memory relies on the two 
sub components of primary and secondary memory. In this case, the path from speed to 
secondary memory should be significant and the path from speed to working memory 
should not.  
The path model (Model 4a) and the path coefficients can be seen in Figure19. The 
model provided a good fit to the data, with a non-significant chi-square and good fit 
statistics (see Table 8). Speed is assumed to not have a direct effect on fluid reasoning.  
The model continued to provide a good fit to the data with a non-significant chi-square 
and good fit statistics (see Table 8), when the non-significant paths were eliminated. Path 
model (Model 4b) and path coefficients can be seen in Figure 20. Even though Models 4a 
and 4b provided a good fit to the data, the models failed to support the idea that both 
 73 
working memory and secondary memory have direct effects on fluid reasoning. This is 
because, as can be seen in Figures 19 and 20 the path coefficients from working memory 
to fluid reasoning in both Models 4a and 4b were significant while the paths from 
secondary memory to fluid reasoning were not. 
However, the results did support the idea that age related improvements in 
secondary memory mediate the improvements in working memory. As can be seen in 
Model 4a, the path between speed and secondary memory was significant while the path 
between speed and working memory was not.  
 
Figure 19.  Path coefficients for the cascade model with secondary memory and working 
memory. The path from speed to fluid is set to zero. When this path was tested it proved 




Figure 20. Path coefficients for the cascade model with secondary memory and working 
memory. All non-significant paths have been eliminated.  
 
Overall, results related to models 4a and 4b indicate that secondary memory does 
not have a direct influence on fluid reasoning, but age-related improvements in secondary 
memory mediate the relations between speed and working memory 
Table  8 
Fit statistics for the path models 
Model Chi 
Square 
df p RMSEA GFI AGFI 
 1 0.15 1 .669 <.001 .999 .993 
 2 0.79 1 .374 <.001 .997 .966 
 3a 1.89 2 .389 <.001 .993 .951 
 3b 3.30 4 .509 <.001 .989 .959 
 4a 0.13 1 .723 <.001 .999 .993 






The primary aim of this study was to consider  secondary memory as a possible 
mediator of age-related improvements in children’s fluid reasoning abilities.  
I wanted to systematically explore the developmental cascade model to determine if a 
large percentage of the age-related variance in fluid reasoning could be accounted for by 
speed, working memory, and secondary memory.  Furthermore, this study was also 
focused on gaining a better understanding of the relationship between working memory 
and secondary memory and why working memory is generally such a good predictor of 
fluid reasoning in children (de Riabaupierre & Lecerf, 2006; Fry and Hale ,1996; 
Nettelbeck et al., 2010). 
The results in the current study showed that children’s speed of processing, 
working memory, secondary memory, and fluid reasoning abilities were all correlated 
with each other.  This pattern of correlations remained somewhat the same when age was 
controlled (except the correlation between speed and fluid reasoning became non-
significant) suggesting that children’s working memory and secondary memory abilities 
predict both age and individual differences in fluid reasoning.  
Regression analysis showed that a large amount of variance was shared between 
working memory and secondary memory. However, working memory contributed to 
significant unique variance in fluid reasoning and secondary memory did not. Path 
analysis supported the findings of the Fry & Hale’s (1996) developmental cascade model 
indicating that working memory mediated the relations between speed and fluid 
reasoning. When secondary memory was substituted to the model for working memory, 
the model provided a good fit, but there was a larger proportion of variance in fluid 
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reasoning that was unexplained. The path models exploring the relations between 
working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning indicated that working memory 
was the key predictor of fluid reasoning explaining all of the variance accounted for by 
secondary memory as well as additional unique variance.  
Overall, the pattern of results indicated that secondary memory was not the 
missing mediator in the developmental cascade model. That is, when secondary memory 
was included as a variable in the path model, there was no direct path between secondary 
memory and fluid reasoning, and there was still a significant proportion of age-related 
variance in fluid reasoning that was unexplained.  
However, these results did help to gain a better understanding of the relations 
among working memory, secondary memory, and fluid reasoning. More specifically, the 
present results were consistent with the claims of Unsworth and Engle (2006, 2007) who 
stated that the key to the relationship between working memory and fluid reasoning is the 
ability to efficiently retrieve information from secondary memory. The pattern of results 
in the path models showed that secondary memory did not have a direct effect on fluid 
reasoning, but influenced the process indirectly by mediating the relationship between 
speed and working memory.  The best-fitting path models (Figures 19 and 20) showed 
that the efficiency and speed at searching and retrieving information from secondary 
memory to be an important aspect of the relationship between working memory and fluid 
reasoning. This pattern of results also supports the claims of Unsworth, Spillers and 
Brewer (2010) who showed primary and secondary memory to be two key components 
within working memory.  
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These results are also consistent with those of Shelton, Elliot, Matthews, Hill, and 
Gouvier (2010) who stated that working memory, but not secondary memory, accounted 
for unique variance when predicting fluid reasoning in a group of young adults.  In 
children, too, there was shared variance between working memory and secondary 
memory, but only working memory accounted for unique variance in fluid reasoning.   
Overall, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. To begin with, the 
present results replicated the findings of Fry and Hale (1996), thus providing further 
evidence supporting the developmental cascade model.  Also, considering the recent 
work on the relation between secondary memory and fluid reasoning, this study showed 
that even though secondary memory and fluid reasoning were related, secondary memory 
is not as good a predictor of fluid reasoning as working memory. That is, the current 
results highlight the fact that there is something “special” about the working memory 
system; it is more than just retrieving information from secondary memory. More 
importantly, this study introduces a new cascade which includes the five constructs of 
age, speed, working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning. The pattern in this 
cascade shows that secondary memory does not directly influence fluid reasoning, but 
instead mediates the relation between speed and working memory.  
Several recent research studies have focused on exploring the relations between 
working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning in young adults (Mogle et al, 
2008, Unsworth, Brewer & Spillers, 2009; and Shelton et al. 2010), but the current study 
is the first to examine both working memory, secondary memory and their relation to 
fluid reasoning in children. As a result, the findings of the current study are of importance 
for the field of education as well as cognitive psychology.  
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As discussed before, recent work in cognitive psychology has focused on studying 
the relationship between working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning in 
adults. Even though these studies found that these three variables were related, the nature 
of the relations was not very clear. The results in the current study suggest that the 
efficiency and speed at searching and retrieving information from secondary memory 
may be an important determinant of working memory, and thus, indirectly, a predictor of 
fluid reasoning 
In the area of education, many studies have explored the relationship between 
working memory and academic abilities such as mathematics (e.g., Swanson & Kim, 
2007; St. Clair Thompson, & Gathercole, 2006), language comprehension (e.g., Kintsch, 
1998; Cain, 2006; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1989), standardized test scores (e.g., Conway 
& Enlge, 1996) and other higher-order cognitive abilities like fluid and crystallized 
intelligence (e.g., Hutton & Towse, 2001, Fry & Hale, 1996; Swanson, 2008).  All of 
these studies claim that working memory is closely associated with academic 
achievement.  
Working memory is known to be a better predictor of academic abilities than 
specific executive abilities such as shifting, updating and inhibitory control (e.g., St. Clair 
-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006), although it has been hypothesized that the reason why 
working memory is a good predictor is because it involves executive abilities (e.g., Engle 
et al., 1999). Even though the role of executive functions was not the focus of the current 
research, I tested the relationship between semantic clustering (which is believed to be an 
executive ability) on the CVLT-C and fluid reasoning. The 15 to-be-remembered words 
from the CVLT-C can be categorized into fruits, clothing and toys. According to the 
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CVLT-C Manual, the ability to consecutively recall words from the same category is 
termed semantic clustering and is considered as an indicator of a child’s ability to 
organize information. Semantic clustering or strategic response organization is generally 
thought to be an executive ability and is used in neuropsychological assessments of 
school-age children (e.g., Koren, Kofman, & Berger, 2005). Moreover, semantic 
clustering is known to allow efficient encoding and retrieval form secondary/ long-term 
memory (Craik, 1981). However, in this study the relationship between semantic 
clustering and fluid reasoning was not significant.  
The results in this study suggest that secondary memory may partially underlie the 
influence of working memory on academic performance.  In reading comprehension and 
tests of crystallized intelligence, retrieving information from secondary memory is 
important. Tests of crystallized intelligence measure learned knowledge, which must be 
retrieved from secondary memory.  Reading comprehension also requires retrieving 
information, both crystallized knowledge and information acquired from the text, from 
secondary memory. Even on fluid reasoning and mathematical reasoning tests, retrieving 
information from secondary memory may be important. This is because partial solutions 
to a problem must often be displaced from primary memory to work on other parts of the 
problem, only to be retrieved from secondary memory later in order to construct the 
complete solution.  According to the findings of the present study, the ability to 
efficiently search and retrieve information from secondary memory influences working 
memory performance which in turn influences fluid reasoning and educational abilities 
such as mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension.   
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Overall, however, the question remains as to why working memory is a good 
predictor of fluid reasoning in children and adults.  There are several possibilities that 
have been explored over the years. One of the first hypotheses to be considered was 
related to working memory load. Carpenter, Just, and Shell (1990) suggested that 
individuals with higher working memory capacity perform better on fluid reasoning tasks 
like the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM)  because a larger working 
memory capacity is an advantage  when problems require the manipulation of multiple 
rules. Recent studies, however, have failed to support an explanation related to working 
memory load. Unsworth and Engle (2005) showed that the relationship between working 
memory and fluid reasoning did not change significantly with the increase in the number 
of rules in RAPM problems. These findings indicated that the amount of simultaneous 
storage and processing (i.e., working memory load) is not a critical aspect that can 
explain the relationship between working memory and fluid reasoning.  
A second line of reasoning was proposed by Engle and colleagues (Engle et al. 
1999) who posited that the ability to control attention in the presence of distraction or 
interference is the underlying reason why working memory is predictive of fluid 
reasoning. More recent work by Unsworth and Engle (2007) further expanded on the 
controlled attention hypothesis. According to Unsworth and Engle, controlled attention 
plays a role in working memory tasks not only in the simultaneous storage and processing 
of information, but also in inhibiting interfering information and limiting the search set 
when retrieving information from secondary memory.  
The ability to retrieve information from secondary memory and its relationship to 
fluid reasoning has been explored in studies of adults and children (Mogle et al, 2008; 
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Unsworth, Brewer & Spillers, 2009; and Shelton et al. 2010).  In children, the ability to 
retrieve information from secondary memory is predictive of higher-order reasoning (De 
Alwis, Myerson, Hershey & Hale, 2009).  However, the present results suggest that when 
secondary memory is measured independently of working memory, working memory 
remains the better predictor of fluid reasoning in children. These findings suggest that it 
is something other than the ability to retrieve information from secondary memory that 
makes working memory a good predictor of fluid reasoning in children.  
This raises the question of whether the role of executive functions in working 
memory explains the relationship between working memory and higher-order cognitive 
abilities. McCabe et al (2010) tested a large group of adults between 18-90 years  on an 
extensive battery of cognitive tests and concluded that the correlation between the latent 
constructs of  working memory capacity and executive attention was so strong (r =.98) 
that they were possibly measuring the same thing. Furthermore, they suggested that this 
underlying executive attention construct was what was predictive of higher-order 
cognitive abilities in adults.  When we re-analyzed the data from McCabe et al. (2010) 
looking at the relationship between working memory, secondary memory, and fluid 
intelligence, however, we found that both working memory and secondary memory each 
accounted for unique variance in predicting fluid intelligence (De Alwis, Myerson, 
McCabe, & Hale, 2010), suggesting that at least in adults, executive attention does not 
completely explain the role of secondary memory in individual differences in higher-
order cognitive abilities.  
Even though McCabe et al. (2010) show that executive functions and working 
memory account for a large proportion of shared variance in adults, in children we see a 
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different pattern.  St. Clair- Thompson and Gathercole, (2006), show that the relationship 
between working memory and academic abilities is stronger than the relationships of 
academic abilities to specific executive functions like inhibitory control, shifting, and 
updating.   
Overall, the question of what makes working memory a good predictor of higher-
order cognition remains unanswered particularly with respect to children.  Finding a 
solution is important for both the children and adults though it is possible that the 
mechanism in adults might not be the same as that in young children. Some of the 
possible mechanisms that could be explored are discussed in the future directions section.  
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A limitation of the current study is the relatively small sample size and the limited 
age range of 6-12 years.  Increasing the age range will enable researchers to determine 
whether the relations among age, 6-12 years change in adolescence or whether the 
relations remain the same as those observed here. 
Also, in this study the measures of working memory were limited to verbal span 
tasks, and the measure of higher-order reasoning was limited to fluid intelligence. Future 
studies should focus on using both verbal and spatial working memory tasks as well as 
other higher-order cognitive functions such as crystallized intelligence and measures of 
academic achievement in order to strengthen and clarify the relations among processing 
speed, working memory, secondary memory, and higher-order cognition.   
In the area of cognitive aging, Hofer and Siliwinski (2001) have argued that cross-
sectional studies over estimate the degree of association between processes (e.g., 
cognitive abilities) that change over time, and the same argument would hold for studies 
of cognitive development as well.  Longitudinal studies, although they present other 
challenges, are free of this bias.  In addition, they can provide information on within-
individual change and both variation and covariation in age-related changes in different 
abilities. Whereas longitudinal studies are especially difficult to conduct on the effects of 
aging because of the amount of time involved, longitudinal studies of cognitive 
development are much more feasible and could add valuable information to our 
understanding. Accordingly, future research should examine the relations among speed of 
processing, working memory, secondary memory, and fluid reasoning using a 
longitudinal approach.   
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With respect to working memory and its relation to education, Alloway and 
colleagues claim working memory to be a better predictor of academic achievement than 
IQ (Alloway & Alloway, 2010). Also, working memory deficits have been found to be a 
characteristic of children with learning difficulties (Alloway, 2009; Alloway, Rajendran, 
& Archibald, 2009). It is possible that poor working memory performance in children 
with learning disabilities might be due to a difficulty in accessing information from 
secondary memory. The current findings suggest that this avenue of research may be 
particularly fruitful.   
Recent work on working memory has focused on working memory training and 
its benefits for special populations of children. For example, studies of working memory 
training have been conducted with children with low working memory and children 
diagnosed with ADHD (Klingberg, Forssberg & Westberg, 2002; Holmes et al. 2009). 
Children with ADHD have difficulties with working memory (Barklay, 1997), academic 
performance (Alloway, Gathercole & Elliott, 2010), and retrieving information from 
secondary memory (Gibson, Gondoli, Flies, Dobrzenski & Unsworth, 2010).  Imaging 
studies of children with ADHD indicate that they have an abnormality in the 
hippocampus, in that they show a larger hippocampal volume than normally developing 
children (Plessen et al. 2006).  Children with diabetes who experience recurrent episodes 
of severe hypoglycemia also show larger hippocampal volumes compared to non diabetic 
sibling controls and diabetic children who do not experience three or more severe 
hypoglycemic episodes. (Hershey, Perantie, Wu, Weaver, Black & White, 2010).  
Because the hippocampus is associated with the formation of secondary/long-term 
memory, it may be important to further examine the relation between working memory 
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and secondary memory in atypically developing children who are known to have 
structural and functional abnormalities in the hippocampal region of the brain.  
With respect to the developmental cascade and the existence of age-related 
variance in fluid reasoning that is not explained by speed or working memory, there are 
some possibilities that can be can be considered. Recent research in young adults 
suggests that individual differences in complex associative learning predict performance 
in fluid intelligence (Tamez, Myerson & Hale, 2008). Another possible avenue stems 
from the fact that fluid tasks like Raven’s Progressive Matrices involve both the 
abstraction and application of different rules. Thus, both complex learning and rule 
abstraction are variables that can be considered as potential mediators that might help to 
explain some of the remaining age-related variance in fluid reasoning in children. More 
importantly, however, another possible missing mediator that needs to be considered are 
the developmental changes in the brain, particularly the frontal cortex, that take place 
during childhood and adolescence (Goldman-Rakic,1987; Demspter,1992). The 
maturation of the frontal regions of the brain is associated with the development of 
executive functions (Conklin, Luciana, Hooper & Yager, 2007) that help with the 
performance on higher-order reasoning tasks, including fluid reasoning.(Ferrer, O’ Hare 
& Bunge, 2009). Future studies involving both neuroimaging and behavioral measures 
are needed to further explore the possibility that underlying developmental changes in the 
frontal regions of the brain can account for age-related improvement in children’s fluid 
reasoning. 
In conclusion, the results in this study suggest that working memory is a better 
predictor of fluid reasoning in children than secondary memory. However, secondary 
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memory plays an important role in the development of fluid reasoning by mediating the 
relationship between speed and working memory.  These results in are helpful in 
understanding the nature of the relationship between children’s processing speed, 
working memory, secondary memory and fluid reasoning. Recent research on cognitive 
development has been largely focused on the role of working memory in higher-order 
functions and educational attainment.  The present results suggest that the development 
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